Freytag v. Commissioner

Freytag v. Commissioner
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued April 23, 1991 Decided June 27, 1991
Full case name	Thomas L. Freytag, et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Citations	501 U.S. 868 (more) 111 S. Ct. 2631; 115 L. Ed. 2d 764
Case history
Prior	89 T.C. 849 (1987); affirmed, 904 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1990); cert. granted, 498 U.S. 1066 (1991).
Holding
Special trial judges of the United States Tax Court are inferior officers of the United States and are thus subject to the Appointments Clause.
Court membership
Chief Justice William Rehnquist Associate Justices Byron White · Thurgood Marshall Harry Blackmun · John P. Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor · Antonin Scalia Anthony Kennedy · David Souter
Case opinions
Majority	Blackmun, joined by Rehnquist, White, Marshall, Stevens; Scalia, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter (except part IV)
Concurrence	Scalia (in part), joined by O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter
Laws applied
U.S. Const. art. II

Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868 (1991), is a United States federal court case in which the Supreme Court of the United States decided the characteristics of inferior officers of the United States for the purposes of the Appointments Clause.^[1]

The case concerned the appointment method of special trial judges of the United States Tax Court. The Court was unanimous in its conclusion that special trial judges were inferior officers under the Appointments Clause, rather than mere employees, because of the characteristics of their office and that their appointment was constitutional. Positions constitute inferior officers when the position (1) is established by law and (2) exercises significant authority (3) involving significant discretion.

The division between the majority, led by Justice Harry Blackmun, and the concurrence, led by Justice Antonin Scalia, centered on the status of the Tax Court itself. Under the Appointments Clause, inferior officers may only be appointed by the President, Heads of Departments, or the Courts of Law. The majority determined the Tax Court, which exercises power as an Article I court was a "Court of Law" for the purpose of the Appointments Clause and was thus constitutional. The concurrence, however, would have held "Courts of Law" are limited to traditional Article III courts. Instead, the concurrence would have permitted the appointments under the view that the Tax Court is a "Head of a Department".